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SIMULATING UAS: HOW MUCH FIDELITY AND WHY? 
 
Gerald P. Chubb 
OSU Dept. of Aviation 
Columbus, OH 43210-1110 
 
The physical, functional, and operational fidelity of a simulation can impact design assessments, training device 
effectiveness, and the validity of research results done with desk-top simulators (or synthetic tasks). While difficult to 
quantify, fidelity issues need to be considered in each of these contexts as attempts are made to improve human system 
integration. This paper reviews some of the implications of fidelity, discusses current efforts to model the impacts 
training can have on performance, and outlines the kinds of empirical testing that could be done to compare Improved 
Performance Research Integration Tool (IMPRINT) model predictions of training impacts to actual performance. 
 
Introduction 
 
Simulations of Uninhabited Aerial Systems (UAS) are 
needed for: a) design evaluation to support human 
system integration, b) design of training aids in concert 
with Instructional Systems Design / Development 
(ISD), and c) research on issues associated with team 
performance in this system context. Computational 
models such as IMPRINT are commonly used as part 
of MANPRINT and SEAPRINT (and in the future, 
perhaps AIRPRINT). Simulations are often later 
embedded in simulators: devices that allow human 
interaction with the simulation or dynamic model of 
some UAS (e.g., Schreiber, et al., 2002). 
 
Simulators are commonly used as training aids, more 
often for operators but sometimes for maintenance 
training as well. Research related to system design 
and human-system integration issues rarely use 
simulators much less real systems. Some form of 
scaled down synthetic task environment or desk top 
simulation is developed to address fundamental 
human performance relationships. Recommendations 
based on such data are sometimes rejected by 
operational / maintenance stakeholders because they 
perceive the lack of fidelity in the synthetic task 
environments (STEs) used for the performance 
research (e.g., Gluck, 2005). 
 
It is the author’s belief that acquisition tradeoff 
studies require fidelity to a different degree than 
training device design or empirical research studies 
aimed at understanding the fundamentals of crew 
behavior in a systems context. Tradeoff studies 
during design can often be limited in scope and use 
some form of part-task simulation. Training devices 
typically require a richer task context, depending on 
the training objective being supported. STEs created 
to study human behavior in a laboratory setting with 
more realistic workload and team interactions (than 
typical academic research) often intentionally 
simplify the task to be performed.  
 
Research on actual systems, using operational 
personnel has seldom been accomplished for a 
number of reasons. First, any such research is 
intrusive by nature, impinging on the operational 
unit’s ability to conduct its mission. Second, systems 
are not typically instrumented to collect data, making 
it difficult to obtain useful measures of performance. 
Third, scenarios used in peacetime typically include 
restrictions that are not imposed in any actual 
wartime operating environment (e.g., low altitude 
restrictions or safe separation distances for safety of 
flight; limited emulation of enemy systems, etc.) 
 
While issues raised here may apply to many other 
systems, the ideas expressed arose in the context of 
looking at what is being done in the Predator (MQ-1), 
an operational UAS that began life as an Advanced 
Concept Technology Development (ACTD) program, 
which allowed development to occur without the 
imposition of formal analysis and design 
requirements imposed on typical system acquisition 
programs.  
 
Early Predator operation had to be done without any 
supporting training device. A Multi-Task Trainer 
(MTT) was later developed, largely by reverse 
engineering of the actual system. Only recently has a 
Predator Mission Aircrew Training System (PMATS) 
been developed to better support operator training.  
AFRL/HEA was tasked to enhance the capabilities of 
IMPRINT to treat the impact of training, in order to 
support trade studies conducted early in system 
acquisition. This paper reflects some of the lessons 
learned as that development has progressed. 
 
Background 
 
Simulation has been defined by Law and Kelton 
(1991) as “… using computers to imitate, or simulate 
operations of various kinds of real-world facilities or 
processes.” It entails modeling some real system, 
capturing selected aspects of its form and function. 
Computer modeling and simulation often occurs early 
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in the design and development of aviation systems 
(particularly aircraft) in order to perform analyses that 
support trade studies to select the preferred alternative 
from a set of implementation options. 
 
Simulation fidelity is typically assessed in terms of 
physical and functional fidelity. Physical fidelity 
requires the simulator to have (some of) the same 
controls, displays, and layout as the actual system. 
However, a simulator is of little use without some 
degree of functional fidelity. Functional fidelity 
refers to whether the simulation behaves like the real 
system. It only requires that the simulation has 
stimuli and responses that are functionally equivalent 
to those of the actual system, allowing that the 
physical features and layout may vary to some 
degree, so long as that does not adversely affect 
performance with respect to the purpose for doing  
the simulation. 
 
Both kinds of fidelity can vary (independently) in the 
degree to which they are realized in any particular 
simulator, training device, or STEs. In research 
situations (and many training applications), it is 
believed that some degree of physical fidelity may be 
sacrificed, so long as an appropriate degree of 
functional fidelity is retained. 
 
However, there are risks in doing that. Face validity 
is often compromised: operational personnel are not 
likely to see that the behavioral aspects of the task are 
retained even with the loss of physical or functional 
fidelity. They will simply recognize the layout is 
nothing like the real system, and they may not trust 
the experimenter to give valid design 
recommendations based on what they see as a 
simplistic task environment. 
 
Operational fidelity is another useful concept, but one 
not typically mentioned in the literature. Since 
behaviors are largely event driven, constructing a 
scenario of mission events representative of 
operational situations can influence the quality and 
validity of trade studies, operator / maintainer 
training, or research study results. If the purpose of 
such simulations is to generalize to real operational 
contexts, then some consideration should be given to 
getting the number, type, pacing, and intensity of 
simulated events to match what operators / 
maintainers will face in real situations. 
 
However, during training (prior to trade studies, for 
real operator / maintainer instruction, or for research 
studies), the level of operational fidelity will need to 
be systematically altered. The more complex and 
difficult the tasks to be performed, the longer the 
period of required preparatory training as the content 
of simulated scenarios is incrementally increased.  
Realistic levels of workload or other imposed 
stressors cannot be introduced before adequate levels 
of skill and proficiency are achieved. 
 
Compromising any of these three kinds of fidelity is 
dangerous for two different but sometimes related 
reasons: a) selected parts of the stakeholder 
community may reject results or recommendations if 
fidelity is too low, and b) the validity of any 
empirical study results may be challenged when 
expected levels of fidelity are lacking. 
 
User acceptance as well as predictive validity 
typically require some acceptable (though difficult to 
define) level of physical, functional, and operational 
fidelity. Problems that can arise out of not providing 
adequate fidelity include the inability to: 1) 
extrapolate research study results to real world 
situations, 2) get design recommendation buy-in from 
stakeholders, and 3) achieve legitimate training 
objectives (achieving positive & effective transfer). 
 
Later, real-time dynamic mockups (simulators) are 
used to verify and validate implemented designs, 
sometimes performing experiments with surrogates 
of the system operators / maintainers (e.g., engineers, 
test pilots, or even human factors specialists serving 
as pseudo-operators). Finally, simulators may be built 
as training aids, most often for operational crews, but 
sometimes for maintenance personnel as well.  
 
IMPRINT and Its Enhancement 
 
IMPRINT (Archer, 1998) is a network-oriented, 
discrete event simulation package used by the Army 
as part of its MANPRINT program (Booher, 1990). It 
is used during system acquisition to model operator 
and maintenance crew performance, including 
assessments of workload, the impact of selected 
stressors, and the impact of training (and skill 
proficiency retention). To develop such models of 
crew activities, data are needed on the task times (and 
optionally, the accuracy of task performance). These 
data can come from a variety of sources (past 
experience, estimates based on micro-models of the 
tasks, expert opinion of task duration, etc.). 
Predictions based on such data can, at least in theory, 
be validated later when either a simulator or the 
actual system is available for empirical studies with 
real operators / maintainers (or suitable surrogates). 
 
Two questions arise in any modeling or simulation 
effort: a) how detailed should the model be, and b) 
what fidelity is needed in a simulator? No one has a 
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completely satisfactory answer to those questions. The 
variables involved are difficult to define much less 
measure. So our discussion here is simply limited to 
some of the perceived issues that one needs to address. 
 
Computer Models and Simulation in 
Support of Human-System Integration 
 
IMPRINT is supposed to help decide how to achieve 
human-system integration (Booher, 2003), across the 
life cycle. That may mean developing more than one 
IMPRINT simulation model. Early in design, crew 
sizing is an issue, and the model needed to address 
that issue may be quite different from the model 
needed to design the human-system interface(s) or 
the impact of training. The number and kinds of 
manpower specialties needed to operate and maintain 
a system affect how well it can be supported in the 
field during sustained military operations.  
 
Manning questions that affect system design have to 
be answered during concept formulation, well before 
the details of interface design and task performance 
can even be addressed. That affects the level of detail 
such models can have. They must intentionally focus 
on larger, more global issues and leave the details of 
individual execution of specific tasks for subsequent 
design decisions. IMPRINT models at this level are 
not particularly detailed in their representation of 
tasks. They focus on multiple job categories / 
specialists in a variety of activities which are at best 
only modestly well-defined. 
 
During the development phase, preliminary design 
focuses on which functions get allocated to hardware, 
software, and ‘liveware’ – people internal and external 
to the system itself. Modeling at this stage becomes 
more detailed and human activities, even specific 
tasks, better defined. Even then, only the nominal 
performance of such tasks is easily represented. 
 
Until detailed design is complete, one cannot define 
malfunction modes, so the workload associated with 
reacting to those conditions is next to impossible to 
describe. Once such details do become available, the 
cost to redesign a system is often prohibitive: 
something of the proverbial ‘Catch 22’ where the 
information the designer needs to do interface design 
(considering realistic levels of workload under 
malfunction conditions) is not available until it is too 
late to change that design. 
 
ISD rests upon the ability to not only define the tasks 
operators / maintainers are expected to perform, but 
determining which of those requires formal 
instruction, considering the conditions under which 
performance will likely occur. That, in part, assumes 
one can determine how often certain tasks will occur 
and what kinds of information will be available to 
support task performance. 
 
Check lists and job guides support operators and 
maintainers in executing required procedures. In 
complex systems, some tasks are infrequently 
performed, so proficiency may decline after initial 
learning occurs. Some form of refresher or 
proficiency training is sometimes required to assure 
adequate proficiency is maintained. 
 
Treating Training and Its Impacts 
 
Models of training and its impacts could be 
developed several ways. IMPRINT’s initial treatment 
of training estimated proficiency decay in task times 
and accuracy as a function of intervening periods of 
non-practice. If a task is not practiced / performed 
regularly, then one would expect subsequent 
performance to take longer and be less accurate. The 
longer the period of non-sue, the greater the expected 
proficiency decrement. 
 
The literature suggests that the greater the degree of 
over-learning, the more robust proficiency becomes to 
this decay with non-use (Chubb, 2004). Archer (2006) 
describes empirical studies, algorithm development, 
and initial modeling of the Predator STE task (Gluck, 
2005) in IMPRINT. The algorithms adjust task time 
and accuracy based on two levels of over-learning and 
two different retention intervals. To date, nobody has 
used IMPRINT to model such things as learning 
strategies or changes that occur with learning, such as 
different network branching variations that occur as 
people learn to do their tasks different, often more 
efficient or effective ways. 
 
Using IMPRINT to Consider the 
Impact of Training Investments 
 
However training impacts might be modeled in future 
versions of IMPRINT, two uses can be envisioned for 
examining the implications of improved training on 
operator / maintainer performance. The first is 
addressed in the context of system acquisition. The 
second is in the context of ISD or more specifically, 
curriculum design. In theory, ISD should proceed in 
parallel to, perhaps lagging, system design. However, 
there is little reason for it to follow system develop-
ment and subsequent deployment, which is all too 
often the case now. 
 
Acquisition Applications. During system design, 
IMPRINT could be applied either (or both) of two 
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ways: 1) to determine how more / better human 
engineering could impact training requirements, and 
2) how various training devices might facilitate 
effectiveness / efficiency of training. No one ever 
advocates poor human engineering, but the quality of 
any design enterprise to some degree rests upon how 
much funding is allocated to that part of a design 
team’s effort. 
 
In many cases, a proposed crew station gets accepted 
only later to be found deficient, leading to its 
redesign. Each version of that crew station interface 
has different training requirements / implications. 
Comparing the cost of one design to the other should 
consider not only how well they function in 
operation, but what the costs are to train for each 
design / configuration of that crew station. 
 
The training community must consider the identified 
training requirements and then design an instructional 
system that adequately meets those defined needs. 
Today, that often occurs only after design is 
completed. Following Initial Operational Capability 
(IOC), the only training that often occurs is ‘on 
system’ (or on the ‘one-of-a kind’ simulators that 
may have been developed to support design / 
development activities) – since any proposed training 
aids or mission simulators are still ‘in development.’ 
 
Use of the ‘one-of-a-kind’ trade study simulators for 
actual training may serve initial needs (e.g. flight test 
crews and the initial instructor cadre indoctrination), 
but these simulators typically would not be suitable for 
crew training applications unless these devices are 
replicated. Being unique, the trade study simulators 
typically do not get system design or software updates 
unless mandated by the customer or user community. 
 
During system acquisition, primary focus is placed 
on the design of the system itself. Little if any 
attention gets focused on how design impacts training 
requirements or how simulators for training operators 
and maintainers could lower overall life cycle costs. 
Modeling could be used to examine the impact of 
lessened training requirements or providing better 
(more efficient / effective) training aids and 
strategies. Those trade studies could have a 
potentially dramatic effect, lowering the overall cost 
of ownership. 
 
 Part-task static or dynamic mockups can be less 
expensive than full mission simulators, but simpler 
devices also tend to be less effective, since they are 
more limited in what they can do: how they can be 
used to train. However, a mix of different kinds and 
types of simulators might prove more effective than 
trying to design a single device that meets multiple 
needs. That seems to be seldom considered 
 
Too often, one and only one level of physical and 
functional fidelity is considered, and that may 
constrain the range of operational fidelity that can be 
attained. That one ‘optimal’ simulator is then built as 
the only training device, rather than considering some 
mix of appropriately configured training aids 
(mockups, part-task simulators, and full mission 
simulators). IMPRINT could be used to assess 
whether some mix of devices could be more cost 
effective than simply buying one device that ‘fits all 
needs’ – typically satisfying none very well. 
 
It is commonly believed that until a system is fully 
designed, any attempt to build a training simulator is 
futile, since the details of how the system operates 
cannot be fully known. That is a myth that needs to 
be dispelled. During Preliminary Design, software 
development documents (SDDs) are generated that 
specify the functions that must be implemented to get 
the crew interface to interact with other embedded 
hardware functions (flight management as well as 
offensive and defensive avionics). 
 
The SDDs (typically available at or shortly after 
Preliminary Design Review) have (or should have) 
sufficient detail to allow simulating a system well 
enough to have a dynamic mockup for operator / 
maintainer training analyses, prior to first flight of the 
aircraft. As design progresses, the mockup and its 
software can be upgraded to mimic approved 
engineering change proposals (ECPs). 
 
Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) software and non-
certifiable mockups of crew station panels are sufficient 
for this purpose. They may not have complete physical 
fidelity, but they have nearly complete functional 
capability and can be used with a broad spectrum of 
scenarios with varied operational fidelity. 
 
Such design simulators (or dynamic mockups) can 
serve at least two roles: 1) provide for independent 
verification and validation of the system and human 
engineering design / integration (and validate any 
models used to assess such designs), and 2) provide a 
prototypical simulator for assessing training aid 
/device utility (supporting ISD). IMPRINT at this 
stage can be used to support curriculum design trade 
studies: what methods should prove relatively more 
effective than others in meeting the training 
requirements imposed by system design, both for 
initial training and for any subsequent upgrade or 
refresher training. 
 
136
A hypothetical acquisition test matrix for training 
impacts is presented in Table 1. The rows suggest 
two levels of human engineering, one more complete 
/ satisfactory than the other. The columns represent 
levels of training aid or device design. The simplest 
level ignores provision of any training aids. The 
second level is some form of part-task trainer, which 
may not be complete representations. The third level 
provides simulators for all crew (operational and / or 
maintainer) positions: a full mission simulator. 
 
The rows then represent two hypothetical levels of 
human factors engineering, one giving minimal 
attention to human system integration and the other 
representing more complete analysis and design. The 
cells in the matrix are then combinations of these two 
independent variables (level of design and training 
device complexity).  
 
 
Table 1. IMPRINT Training Impact  
Analyses During Acquisition. 
 
     Training Device Complexity 
 None     Part-  Full 
Human         Task       Mission 
Engineering: 
  Baseline    Multi-Task Crew  
Level 1:  System    Static  Station 
Design     Mockup Simula- 
tion 
System 
 
  Improved  Multi-Task      Complete 
Level 2:  Interface   Dynamic         Training 
  Design    Mockup          System 
 
 
The upper left cell in Table 1 represents the baseline 
system design, with minimal (if any) human 
engineering, and no training aid: all training would 
have to be ‘on system’ once deployed. The middle 
cell in the top row combines minimal human 
engineering with only a static mockup for operator / 
maintainer training. This is adequate for 
familiarization and for procedures rehearsal, but not 
for time-paced procedures practice. The right most 
cell in the first row represents a complete mission-
crew / maintenance simulator, but without any 
corresponding ISD / curriculum design. 
 
In the second row of Table 1, greater emphasis is 
placed on design: first in the system itself and then 
for the training aids that support that system. It is 
assumed that improved interface design will reduce 
the training requirements, irrespective of subsequent 
training system or training device design. Dynamic 
mockups provide the ability to support individual and 
perhaps team rehearsal of event-paced procedures, 
something static mockups cannot do. This is perhaps 
more important for operational crew training than for 
maintenance. Finally, complete training systems 
design, to include full-mission simulation provides 
maximum support for the operational and 
maintenance crew training. 
 
The question during system acquisition is which level 
of funding is justified in order to minimize life cycle 
ownership costs. Complex training devices can equal 
or even exceed aircraft costs. So, justifying the cost-
effectiveness of such proposed training solutions 
becomes important. IMPRINT modeling might very 
well assist analysts in justifying such expenditures, or 
preclude investing in them, if unwarranted. 
 
Curricular Design Applications. The other use of an 
enhanced version of IMPRINT could be applied 
during ISD in order to assess the relative merits of 
curriculum design, training strategies, and presentation 
methods. There are at least three areas of concern: 1) 
initial knowledge and skill acquisition, 2) declines in 
knowledge and proficiency with non-use, and 3) 
recovery with practice / re-use. IMPRINT is being 
modified to address such issues. This is a complement 
to and parallels its use during system acquisition. 
 
The principal problem in such model development is 
the lack of supporting data. The literature does 
describe the rate of skill acquisition and variables that 
affect proficiency and retention. Less is known about 
rates of decay with non-use, and even less about 
recovery rates with subsequent re-use / practice / 
rehearsal. However, this problem is of growing 
interest, especially as the military uses joint forces  
where the combat teams are some mix of regular, 
reserve, and guard personnel, each of whom may 
have different levels or kinds of training and varied 
opportunities to practice learned skills under combat-
like conditions. 
 
Current attempts to collect empirical data have been 
based on synthetic tasks in a laboratory setting with 
surrogates for test subjects rather than subject matter 
experts using actual system operating or maintenance 
procedures. This presents a number of problems yet 
to be resolved. First, the synthetic tasks lack face 
validity to operational personnel: the data and 
predictions based on such data are suspect. Second, 
the synthetic tasks do not provide context validity: 
they do not include the full range of knowledge and 
skills operational personnel are expected to have. 
Third, there have been no studies of predictive 
137
validity. So, how well these data can be used to 
predict training impacts for real situations is unclear. 
 
However, with all those deficiencies duly noted, some 
analysis is believed to be better than no analysis at all. 
Systems will be designed with or without the help of 
human systems integration specialists, and with or 
without any analyses of operator / maintainer 
performance. It is believed that the present attempts to 
enhance IMPRINT to treat training impacts is needed 
and useful. Validation of model predictions and 
extension of the database to support such modeling 
efforts is obviously necessary future research.  
 
Two case studies seem warranted as the next step in 
validating IMPRINT training impacts enhancement 
efforts. First, the Ground Control Station for Predator 
(MQ-1) may be redesigned, improving the human 
engineering of the Air Vehicle Operator and Sensor 
Operator interfaces, which will change the training 
requirements. Concurrently, the current Multi-Task 
Trainer is being replaced by the Predator Mission 
Aircrew Training System. Studies of each of these 
efforts could fill two, possibly three cells of the test 
matrix presented in Table 1. Such case studies would 
go a long way toward convincing the acquisition  
and training communities that IMPRINT modeling  
can be useful. 
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